Operation Ali Baba
January 20th 2005
There is no doubt at all that it was the duty of the occupying power to
prevent looting. In Baghdad there was a spectacular failure to do this,
which appeared to be a policy decision. The traditional way to prevent
looting after an invasion and occupation is (1) to publish a
declaration, visible on posters written in large letters in all the
languages the inhabitants are deemed to be familiar with, posted in
every street and broadcast by any means available including loud
speaker vans, that looters will be shot on sight and (2) to start
shooting them on sight all over town. The sooner you start, the fewer
have to be shot. This is the only method that has been known to work
but clearly, in light of the fact that the invasion of Iraq was to
remove a regime that would operate in this way even in peacetime, it
was not considered appropriate.
The Geneva
Convention has not been tested in either the traditional world or the
current circumstances, so nobody can say if there is an effective way
of stopping looting within the Geneva Convention. However, that is
exactly what was attempted in Operation Ali Baba. Unfortunately we are
now told that the commanders got it wrong; that the order to 'Work them
hard" was illegal, even if it had been interpreted in a way that did
not include sexual or physical humiliation. Personally I would have
thought the only way to stop looting would be to either shoot, imprison
or scare the living daylights out of offenders, so I am not impressed
by those who expect them to be treated with kid gloves.
The really
extraordinary part of this is that it was not appreciated that
humiliation was never the right tactic, and to put individuals in
humiliating circumstances and then photograph it was an invitation to
disaster. All photographs get published eventually if their publication
has value. The publication of photos of this sort undermine the entire
mission. I can only deduce that there was no operational post created
for the individual who should have foreseen and prevented this. The
individuals who took the pictures are guilty of stupidity. That is not
yet a criminal offence. I do not know the current regulations about the
use of cameras by serving soldiers on operations and the ownership of
the results, so I shall hold my comments on the guilt of senior
officers until more is revealed.
I do not feel
constrained by the court martial judge's remarks so far as the whole
purpose of this entire web site is pre-judgment. No judgments are made
here with the benefit of hindsight, even if they are made after the
events.
JANUARY 22nd 2005
We have now been told two things of importance. First that the locals
wanted the looters shot, but this was deemed inappropriate for reasons
I have touched on already. Second that photography was part.of the
policy of Ali Baba, to establish the identity of looters and, to show
them being 'worked hard' as a deterrent to others. This was obviously
sensible and if the Geneva Convention forbade it, or the 'hard working'
of the looters, then the Convention was correctly ignored. We have
known since the beginnings of civilisation that the law is for the
guidance of wise men and the literal obeyment of fools.
But what is becoming even more obvious is that in these
circumstances all those dealing first hand with the looters should have
had a clear briefing that covered the details of what 'working hard'
did not mean, under any circumstances, and what rules applied to the
use of cameras and the photographs taken with them. Once again we come
back to the view that there seems to have been an important post in the
military structure which was not created - that of an officer in charge
of ensuring that the mission's entire legitimacy and logic was not at
risk of public destruction by inappropriate actions, either in front of
the world audience or in secret. The Major in charge of Operation Ali
Baba may have done all he could under pressure at the time, but where
was the support and guidance that should have come from a specialist
officer to whom this situation and its dangers should have rung all the
warning bells there are and who should have produced at short order the
required
instructions and the way to impart them? How is it possible that this
was not foreseen when most observers were worrying about little else?
When responsible governments take international law into their own
hands because the UN is corrupted, they take on an awesome
responsibility.
They are bound to make mistakes, but this type of mistake indicates a
structural failure.
FEB 26th 2004
We now have the results of the Court Martial, and the sentences, which
cannot be faulted, sad though it is. The reputation of the Army must be
restored and upheld. The defendants were found guilty. If unpunished,
the suspicion that such actions were to be tolerated would have been
reinforced, and the defence of some of the accused was exactly that.
It is easy for armchair critics to forget the pressure that all ranks
were under in the period of the build up to the invasion, when
ambiguity reigned supreme. On the one hand, the threat to Saddam had to
be real, on the other hand it was politically impossible to commit the
full resources till the die was cast, as the hope remained that Saddam
would realise the game was up and flee to sanctuary abroad. Presumably
it is for this reason that clear instructions for the postwar scenario
were not prepared or issued, including how to handle looters.
General Jackson was right to apologise sincerely on behalf of the army,
as responsibility does go higher that the accused. These men were
foolish and used their authority wrongly and interpreted their
instructions inappropriately, but the situation was not properly
prepared and this can be seen, as I suggested earlier, as a structural
fault in the army.
How to deal with looters under the Geneva Convention should have been
the subject of careful consideration within the military the moment the
invasion was inevitable. One can only assume that it would require
their official arrest and detention pending due legal process. The army
was in no way equipped at the time to do this as the situation was
extremely precarious. The UK government was at fault as some of its key
players in postwar reconstruction such as Claire Short had abandoned or
not exercised their responsibilities. The instructions for Ali Baba to
catch looters and 'work them hard' was therefore the only option at the
time, but that should have made it even more vital to define the
methods accurately, since they they were temporarily in breach of the
strict interpretation of the Convention. As for any contention that
this was a 'collective punishment' forbidden under the Convention, that
is wrong. A collective punishment is one where the innocent are
punished along with the guilty. There is no claim that those being made
to work hard were not looters.
Finally we should note that while those who suffered from the treatment
have not had their lives or their health permanently affected, those
who abused them have had their careers and reputation totally and
publicly destroyed. Punishment does not come much greater than that. If
we weigh up the merits and demerits of peoples lives and their
punishments and rewards, it might appear we expect very much more of
some than of others. I have no doubt that in postwar Iraq there are
those without food, money, hope or ethics. The temptation to rob a
supply camp was probably considerable. Against that force of nature we
set soldiers under strain who have carried out a tough campaign, with
instructions to teach them a serious and deterrent lesson. Then, in
hindsight, the world demands justice. How is that possible? The results
of the Court Martial will stand. There will no doubt be others. All we
can expect is that all do their best as events unfold. Life proceeds by
a process of trial and error, and we attempt to keep records and learn
from the past while technical progress advances the capabilities.